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26 By Linus A. Hoskins
Jamaica Under Seaga:
1981-1983
Prime Minister [Edward] Seaga viewed his [1980] election as “a declaration against Commu­nism in Jamaica” and promised 
a moderate government following a 
nonaligned policy of good relations 
with all.1 Describing his party’s victory 
in the October 30, 1980 general elec­
tions as “an overwhelming mandate by 
the people of Jamaica,” the prime 
minister has insisted that the victory 
enabled his government to “give the 
people the policies and programmes 
necessary to restore the economy.” In 
his first official address to the people, 
he said:
. .. We hope to offer, in this new era of 
our political life, the people of famaica a 
principled government. We hope to offer 
the people o f Jamaica in this new era 
creative government. We hope to offer a 
government o f sanity. We hope to offer a 
government that knows where it is going 
and can say so with conviction and with 
credibility. We hope to offer a govern­
ment that will not have hostile relations 
with the international fora of the world, 
but will have good relations with the 
international community of nations and 
we hope to offer a government that has 
no quarrel within our domestic situation 
with those particular segments o f our 
society which are the roots o f our demo­
cratic system and our constitutional proc­
ess . . .2
According to some political observ­
ers, Seaga’s landslide election victory 
represented “a mandate for (his) free 
enterprise programmes and a rejection 
of the socialist experiment of the 
former Michael Manley administra­
tion, which was accused of spreading 
poverty instead of wealth”.3
The prime minister has indicated 
that his victory and similar conser-
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vative swings in the Caribbean were “a 
message that we are ready to contain 
the expansion of Cubanism” and that 
the move away from the influence of 
the Soviet Union and Cuba has gained 
momentum because of economic mis­
management under socialist regimes. 
Seaga has said that another reason that 
Cubanism has failed to win support in 
the Caribbean was due to socialism’s 
“ ideological incompatibility” with 
Caribbean peoples’ thinking and he 
reassured Jamaicans that with his elec­
toral victory they were now “free of 
ideological adventurism”.
. . .The economic and ideological mis­
adventure of the Marxist system was not 
acceptable to a people accustomed to the 
lifestyle and expectations of the market 
system. . .4
As an unabashed proponent of the 
free enterprise system, Seaga is con­
vinced that Jamaica’s bread is buttered 
in Washington and not, as his pred­
ecessor seemed to believe, in Havana 
or Moscow. As a result, he wasted no 
time in reversing Jamaica’s political 
course in order to undo the damage 
which, he charges, has been caused by 
eight years of mismanagement and ex­
perimentation with Cuban-type solu­
tions.5
In the foreign policy area, the Seaga 
administration is staunchly anti-Com- 
munist and stresses that its “first 
priority is to re-establish confidence in 
Jamaica as a stable pro-Western na­
tion”. According to the government’s 
election manifesto, its policy is to halt 
what it sees as “the expansionist 
movement of Communist imperialism” 
and to “combat the threat of alien ideol­
ogies” in the region.
On the issue of nonalignment, unlike 
the Manley administration, the Seaga 
administration not only does not intend 
to play an aggressive role in the move­
ment but is also determined not to take 
a “high profile in any single direction”. 
By adopting this “constructive role”, 
the administration seeks to avoid “the 
advocacy of one cause or the other 
which could prejudice (its) ability to 
conciliate” its own national interests.
T he Seaga administration is also determined to stymie the “ in te rfe ren ce  of foreign powers in (its) domestic 
affairs” and guided by the “greater 
principle of moral judgement”, it has 
vowed always to commit itself “to the 
struggle against racist regimes, wher­
ever they may be” and likewise those 
“regimes which violate human rights.” 
The government is also adamantly 
against “ racist oppression and 
colonialism.” According to the govern­
ment’s manifesto:
. . . We support liberation movements 
against racism, oppression and colonial­
ism. We do not accept that liberation 
movements can justify our support in any 
country whose nationals freely vote to 
establish or continue any political rela­
tionship. Nor do we support expansionist 
movements operating under the guise of 
liberation movements; and we condemn 
all the disguised attempts to infiltrate 
and exploit any country. . . 6
And finally, with regard to regional 
interests, the [Seaga] administration 
regards the Caribbean as its “natural 
area of interest” with emphasis placed 
on the role of CARICOM, the Carib­
bean Bank and the University of the 
West Indies (UWI). Its overall policy 
position on the Caribbean is that “with 
closer cooperation for mutual benefit”, 
Caribbean governments “can halt the 
expansionist movement of Communist 
imperialism operating under the 
pretext of a liberation movement.” 
Prime Minister Seaga’s paranoid
obsession with the spread of “Com- 27 
munist imperialism” is directed 
toward C astro’s Cuba. Indeed, 
throughout the 1980 campaign, Seaga 
threatened the Cubans by warning that 
they would not be welcomed “if they 
are becoming involved in (Jamaica’s) 
domestic politics” and are bent on ex­
porting revolution to the region.
. . . I f  Castro wants to be accepted in 
this region, then he must be able to prove 
his credentials by not exporting revolu­
tion or ideology. We are rather firm  in 
our belief that he exported revolution to 
Greruida, and. . .to Nicaragua. We 
believe that Cuban expansionism will con­
tinue through its role as a proxy for the 
Soviet Union. The Cubans set up Jamaica 
as their espionage center of the Caribbean 
so they could have easier access to subver­
sives on other islands, who could come 
here to deal with them rather than going 
to Havana and risking exposure. How can 
you normalize relations with a country 
acting like that. . . ?7
To demonstrate that he meant busi­
ness, Seaga’s first act as prime minister 
was to expel Cuban Ambassador Ulises 
Estrada, who left Jamaica on Novem­
ber 3, 1980 along with several other 
Cubans. In addition to the accusation 
that Cuba was “instrumental in smug­
gling arms and ammunition into 
Jamaica” during the 1980 election cam­
paign, the Seaga government specifical­
ly accused Estrada of being involved in 
a scheme that illegally shipped 200,000 
shotgun shells and .38 caliber pistol am­
munition to Jamaica from Miami and of 
stockpiling M-16 rifles in the Cuban 
Embassy—rifles which were allegedly 
used to attack supporters of the 
Jamaican Labour Party (JLP) and the 
security forces.8
In January 1981, the Jamaican gov­
ernment terminated the “brigadista” 
program and immediately recalled all
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Jamaican students who were in Cuba 
under the program. According to a 
State Department report, under the 
“brigadista” program, Cuba “trained 
about 1,400 Jamaican youths in Cuba as 
construction workers.” Furthermore, 
“political indoctrination in Cuba formed 
part of this group’s curriculum” during 
which the “youths received military 
training while in Cuba, including in­
struction in revolutionary tactics and 
use of arms.”9
O n October 29, 1981, after one year in office, the Seaga administration did the ultimate by breaking diplomatic rela­
tions with Cuba, claiming that Havana 
had sheltered/harbored criminals 
wanted for prosecution by police in 
Jamaica.10
And in December 1982, the Jamaican 
government refused to extend the work 
permit of Cuban journalist Godefroid 
Tchamlesso, who had been covering 
the Caribbean for eight years as chief 
correspondent for Prensa Latina. No 
reasons were given by the government 
for denying the extension.
Needless to say, the Jamaican gov­
ernment’s decision to sever diplomatic 
relations with Cuba in 1981 was greeted 
with indignation by opposition parties, 
both in and out of Jamaica, and by the 
Cuban government. In fact, as a riposte 
to the government’s bizarre, diplomatic 
action, Jamaica’s opposition People’s 
National Party [PNP] Vice-President 
and former Foreign Affairs Minister 
Percival Patterson headed a high-level 
delegation which left for Havana on 
November 11, 1981 “to discuss with 
Cuban officials the recent break of 
diplomatic relations with Cuba by the 
government of Prime Minister Edward 
Seaga”11 and “to consolidate long­
standing relations between the PNP 
and the communist party of Cuba”.12 
The PNP condemned the government’s 
decision, arguing that the government 
“had tendered no evidence that the 
men were in Cuba” and suggested that 
“several steps could have been taken to 
show displeasure short of severing rela­
tions”. The PNP also called on the gov­
ernment “to allow freedom of move­
ment to all Jamaicans wishing to visit 
Cuba”.13
For its part, the government brought 
a parliamentary censure motion against 
PNP’s General Secretary and opposi­
tion member of Parliament D.K. Dun­
can for “behaving in a manner pre­
judicial to the national interest.” The 
government’s Minister of National 
Security and Justice, W inston 
Spaulding, accused Duncan of making 
public statements “supportive of a 
foreign power with which Jamaica had 
severed diplomatic connections for 
behaving in a manner prejudicial to 
Jamaica’s interest and particularly in 
respect to the island’s security.” The 
government’s position was that by sen­
ding the top-level delegation to Cuba,
When he became prime 
minister in 1980, Edward 
Seaga stated that he 
inherited a nation that 
was ‘lurching from crisis 
to crisis’.
the PNP “appeared willing to subor­
dinate the interests of Jamaica to those
of Cuba.”14
Indeed the PNP was not the only
political faction in Jamaica that rejected
the government’s diplomatic break with
Cuba. In an opinion poll conducted in
December 1981, “a majority of 
Jamaicans disagree(d) with the Seaga 
government’s break in diplomatic ties 
with Cuba.” The poll, which was con­
ducted by JLP supporter political scien­
tist Carl Stone, indicated a 48 percent 
disagreement with the decision, while 
41 percent favored the action. Eleven 
percent had no opinion. The same poll 
also revealed:
. . . as many as 21 percent of the ruling 
JLP’s own supporters did not endorse the 
government’s action. And among the 
opposition PNP supporters, some 91 per­
cent of those interviewed were solidly 
behhid their party’s stand in objecting to 
the break in diplomatic relations with 
Cuba. The poll disclosed that JLP sup­
porters and “independent opinion” were 
against the break largely because of the 
(spurious reasons advanced by the govern­
ment. . . 15
The Cuban government categori­cally denied the Jamaican government’s charges that it harbored criminals wanted by 
police in Jamaica. Cuba responded by 
charging that the break in diplomatic 
relations “was carried out by the 
government of Seaga but was decreed 
in Washington.. .as one more step in 
the Yankee government’s aggressive 
anti-Cuban strategy.” The Cuban 
government also accused Seaga of 
attempting to be “the most loquacious 
leading choir boy of imperialism in the 
Caribbean”.
Domestic Policy
The cardinal features of the Seaga 
administration’s supply-side economic 
philosophy are that “the private sector 
must save the country and that market 
forces would be allowed to have full 
play”.16 The government is guided by 
the belief that “the first lesson is that 
Socialism cannot produce economic 
growth” and that after eight years of 
Socialist policies which virtually turned 
Jamaica into a “giant slum”, the only 
prescription that can restore economic 
vitality is an economy “which rewards 
personal initiative and enterprise.” The 
specifics of this new philosophy are 
(i) reliance on the private sector (free 
enterprise) and foreign investment to be 
the “leader in the country’s economic 
development” (ii) deregulation of the 
economy and (iii) an export-oriented 
structural adjustment program.
The government intends to rely on 
the “participation of the private sector 
through the provision of technology and 
managerial skills” to reverse the flag­
ging fortunes of the important export 
crops, banana and sugar, and make a 
new thrust in housing.17 In the area of 
housing, the government seeks to enter 
into joint-ventures with private reput­
able companies to develop low and 
middle-income homes. Two thousand 
homes were scheduled for building in 
1982 under this arrangement. The gov­
ernment insists that “rent control 
would remain as a means of protecting 
the tenant” but as Minister of 
Construction Bruce Golding warns:
..  . i f  the day should come when the 
supply reached saturation point, then the 
government would monitor the situation 
arid if it demands, we will relax control
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drain on the public purse.” The govern­
ment has also indicated that it will not 
protect local businesses from foreign 
competition and further that the “pro­
cess of protection” they enjoyed under 
the Manley government would be dis­
continued. The Seaga administration 
has argued that by permitting the 
importation of cheaper products, the 
cost of living will be reduced and the 
consumer also stands to benefit. As a 
result, local producers faced with 
cheaper products would be forced into 
the production of products “which
Seaga’s first act as prime 
minister was to expel 
Cuban Ambassador 
Ulises Estrada.
were offered tax incentives for up to 10 
years, they were not “granted protec­
tion from competition as was the policy 
in the past.”
The questions segments of the 
private sector were asking were: Can 
the relatively underdeveloped Jamaican 
economy, shielded from foreign compe­
tition for decades, withstand the impact 
of the change? Can local manufacturers, 
strangled by shortage of foreign ex­
change to buy raw materials and bur­
dened by inferior technology, compete 
in terms of quality and prices with prod­
ucts from high-powered transnationals? 
However, foreseeing the tremendous 
dislocations that could result from the 
deregulation policy, the government ap­
plied to the World Bank for a “struc­
tural adjustment loan”, apparently to 
provide the foreign exchange element 
vital for the adjustment that had to be 
made.
progressively. But the fa d  that we cannot 
deregulate now, does not negate our posi­
tion to deregulate in this sedion of the 
economy when we can. . . 18
The Jamaican government has also 
placed a great deal of emphasis on 
attracting foreign investment. Accord­
ing to Prime Minister Seaga, Jamaica 
received 408 “serious” investment pro­
posals worth over US $550 million and 
requiring two and a half million square 
feet of factory space, as of September 
1, 1981. The proposals represented an 
employment potential of 25,000 per­
sons and consisted of US $338 million 
in foreign investment (embracing 244 
projects) and US $218 million in local 
investment (covering 164 projects).
And in an attempt to coordinate/con- 
solidate private sector and foreign 
investment policies, the Private Sector 
Organization of Jamaica (PSOJ) and a 
Joint U.S./Jamaica Investment Com­
mission were formed, and in June 1982 
the government established an Advi­
sory Council to the Minister of Industry 
and Commerce “to further cooperation 
between itself and the private sector”. 
The Council was also charged with 
monitoring “the implementation of 
structural adjustment and economic 
restoration programmes, including the 
deregulation of the economy.”19
A s mentioned, a major element of the government’s free enterprise policy is deregula­tion of the economy. This 
“irrevocable” policy means that since 
private enterprise can run business 
more efficiently than government, then 
the government would try to divest 
itself of many public enterprises. For 
example, by July 1981, six publicly- 
owned enterprises with total assets of 
US $137 million were sold to the 
private sector by the government 
Divestment Committee as a signal of 
the government’s resolve that “govern­
ments should not run business enter­
prises.” It should be pointed out that 
these public companies were set up by 
the PNP “in its attempts to control the 
commanding heights of the economy”.
The Seaga government is now argu­
ing that since the combined losses from 
these and other statutory corporations 
totalled US $250 million over the past 
five years, then, its policy of divestment 
represents “an effort to get rid of 
uneconomic dead-wood which (is) a
have viable markets in which they can 
compete.”
In other words, the government has 
adopted what some political commenta­
tors have termed “a policy of doctrin­
aire capitalism”.20 As one Jamaican col­
umnist observes:
. . . (By this policy), the government 
will deregulate the economy and phase out 
all the various restridions and licenses 
and red tape with which the Manley 
administration had entangled the private 
sector in its efforts to keep track of and 
control the flow of scarce foreign ex­
change. . .21
The aim of deregulation was “to 
make a radical switch from the import- 
substitution approach used for the past
20 years to industrialization by export
orientation”.22 And to show that it
meant business, the government an­
nounced in July 1981 that “no licenses 
at all would be needed to import certain 
items” and in October 1982, 400 items 
were removed from the list of quan­
titative restrictions “because by and 
large, they were not locally produced.”
In addition, while the several hundred 
local and foreign investment applicants
Prime Minister Seaga has stated that the special responsibility in the structural adjustment of the Jamaican economy was 
transforming it from largely a domestic 
productive sector to one that produced 
for export. He adds that the basic objec­
tive was to gear the manufacturing sec­
tor for export so as to be a net earner of 
foreign exchange. According to Seaga, 
the process of structural adjustment 
embodied deregulation, marketing and 
incentives and the program was being 
carried out on a very methodical and 
systematic basis. He concludes by in­
dicating that policies were put in place 
to ensure markets and provide incen­
tives and that the strategy of deregula­
tion was devised to remove the restric­
tions on certain consumer items.23 
Nevertheless, some analysts have in­
sisted that the government had to 
implement aspects of the deregulation 
program even before it received the 
World Bank loan as a precondition to 
convince the Bank that it was serious 
about its new policy. In addition, the 
U.S. business sector had also put pres­
sure on the government to “free up the 
market” again as a precondition for 
U.S. private investment.
I t should be pointed out here that the Seaga government made a serious mistake in opening up or deregulating the Jamaican econ­
omy so suddenly. This view has had
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widespread support in Jamaica. Manu­
facturers and exporters associations 
and the Workers Party of Jamaica were 
among its supporters, while the 
Jamaican business sector became indig­
nant at the government’s deregulation 
policy and the fact that it had tremen­
dous difficulty in obtaining foreign ex­
change for exports. According to R. 
Anthony Williams, president of the 
Jamaican Manufacturers Association, 
“thirty-three factories have been closed 
because of the problems spawned by 
the governm ent’s (deregulation) 
policy.”24 Also, staunch JLP supporter, 
Gleaner columnist Carl Stone, warned 
the government that when the Chilean 
economy was opened up overnight in 
the two-year period 1975-77, employ­
ment in the manufacturing sector fell 
by 18 percent due to uncontrolled com­
petition from cheap imports. He went 
on to ask:
. . . Why should the technocrats of the 
World Bank ayid the IMF [International 
Monetary Fund] be pressuring us to open 
up the economy fully when in their own 
countries protectionism is on the upswing 
and none of these countries has opened up 
beyond controlled competition?. . .25
Another deleterious effect of this new 
policy was that since industrial develop­
ment in Jamaica was “established and 
engineered for the protected local 
market” during the 1950s and 1960s, 
by removing that protection such a 
policy (which was formulated in collu­
sion with an IMF agreement) has had 
serious effects on employment and 
investment. And the eventual denoue­
ment has been that the Jamaican econ­
omy has become dominated by foreign 
investors and a few rich Jamaicans—a 
situation which existed in the 1960s26 
during the JLP’s reign to the extent 
that domestic and foreign capitalists 
had such a field day that Jamaica came 
to be known as the “new Riviera”. This 
was the same situation the Manley 
administration sought to rectify and in 
which a massive brain drain of 
Jamaican professionals and business­
man to North America occurred, and 
destabilization measures were taken 
against his administration by the U.S. 
government and the IMF.
And finally, the Seaga government 
has indicated that its structural adjust­
ment program is primarily based on the
premise that an unfettered economy 
will kindle orientation toward export 
production and create the resources 
necessary for economic and social 
development. The centerpiece of the 
structural adjustment is to gear the 
manufacturing sector to seek markets 
overseas as opposed to the import sub­
stitution model that had been followed 
since Jamaica began its industrializa­
tion program in the late 1950s. This is 
to be backed up by the development of 
the export agricultural sector, particu-
One must bear in mind 
that there are at least 
two sides to every story.
larly the export of nontraditional 
crops.27
Impact of New Economic Policies
When he became prime minister in 
1980, Edward Seaga stated that he 
inherited a nation that was “lurching 
from crisis to crisis.” Two years later, 
he insisted that Jamaica has experi­
enced an “economic miracle”, an “eco­
nomic turn-around” through a policy of 
reliance on private enterprise. This, he 
insists further, represents “change 
without chaos” and “a mammoth 
achievement.” Deputy Prime Minister 
and Minister of Foreign Affairs and 
Foreign Trade, Hugh Shearer, also has 
suggested that the Jamaican economy 
had demonstrated positive growth rates 
as a result of the “combination of a free 
market economy supported by the 
public sector and the entrepreneurial 
skills of an enlightened private 
sector.”28 And in a report to Parliament 
on the government’s second year in of­
fice, Prime Minister Seaga said:
. . .[As] the first government in 
Jamaica’s history to come to office and
find the cupboard bare, we had to rebuild 
a shattered economy laid waste by years of 
inefficiency ami neglect, and to return the 
country to a path of growth after 8V2 
years—just 18 months short of a decade— 
of declining production. . ,29
In his report, the prime minister out­
lined the main achievements of his 
government as follows:
. . .  We have restored a sense of order, 
rationality and predictability to the coun­
try’s life. By the same token we have 
brought back confidence to the country 
and hope in its future. Crime and violence 
have been reduced and people no longer 
have the acute sense of personal insecurity 
that was for the most part the case in the 
later years of the Seventies when there 
was the comistent fear o f attack from the 
gunman, the crimiml and the “revolu­
tionary.” We have put basic food items 
and other necessities back on the shelves 
and in continuing supply, ending the 
anxiety of the housewife and the prosperi­
ty of black marketeers trading in basic 
human needs and profiting on the suffer­
ing of shortages.
So too have we eased the shortages of 
basic medical supplies and equipment 
with more consistent flows as we move 
towards fu ll restoration of services.
We have turned around the economy, 
registering positive growth, a distinctive 
achievement against the negative back­
ground of where we were coming from 
and in the context o f the most punishing 
world recession in 50 years. In doing so, 
we are swimming against the world tide 
and gaining, while many, including the 
prosperous and powerful, are slipping. 
Only 5 of the more than 50 countries in 
this hemisphere are likely to show any 
growth this year and Jamaica is one.
We have restored confidence in Jamaica 
among the world’s financial institutions, 
making it possible for us to find the money 
for Jamaica’s development needs.
We have begun the diffiadt but essen­
tial task o f structurally adjusting our 
economy for future sustained growth 
which can meet competition and profit, 
hot lose, by it.
We have created new investment starts 
in industry a)id agricidture in the econ­
omy at the rate of nearly eight per month 
or two per week. When last did that ever 
happen?
We are laying the foundation for the 
recovery of our major agricultural crops,
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introducing a spectacular range of new 
crops, and providing the farmer with 
abundance of credit and services. We have 
turned around the crash in tourism to 
prosperity for the economy and particu­
larly for the workers.
We are bringing order to real estate 
development and justice and equity to the 
business o f rental of premises.
We are bringing order into our public 
transportation system to provide reliable 
and reputable service. And, because we 
dare to care about corruption in public life 
we have initiated mechanisms to ensure 
the integrity of the award of contracts 
through the establishment o f an Insur­
ance Placements Committee and the 
appointment of a Contractor-General. . .
Because we dare to care about the young 
we have created the H.E.A.R.T. Pro­
gramme to give them the skills to “learn to 
earn ’’for their future. We are building 50 
primary schools because we dare to care 
that a place in school should be the birth­
right of every child.
We have introduced compulsory educa­
tion because we dare to care that our 
children shall not grow up crippled by 
illiteracy.
Because we dare to care, we are estab­
lishing a Golden Age Home to offer a 
higher level of care for the aged helpless 
and the poor. . .
In more specific and statistical terms, 
he cited the following achievements.
(i) Real economic growth of 3.3 per­
cent in 1981, 1.0 percent in 1982 and
1.7 percent for 1983, compared to an 
annual average growth rate of minus
2.8 percent between 1973-80;
(ii) Agriculture grew by 3.5 percent in 
1981, after an annual average growth 
rate of minus 0.5 percent between 
1973-80;
(iii) Manufacturing grew by 0.4 per­
cent in 1981; after an annual average 
growth rate of minus 3.6 percent be­
tween 1973-80;
(iv) Construction grew in 1981 by 2.5 
percent and by 26 percent in 1982; after 
an annual average growth rate of minus 
9.6 percent between 1973-80;
(v) Capital formation grew by 26 per­
cent in 1981; after an annual average 
growth rate of 6 percent between 
1973-80;
(vi) Foreign exchange reserves annual 
change (surplus) was 43.0 million in
1981; after being a negative figure be­
tween 1979-80;
(vii) Current account deficit averaged 
minus 1.8 percent in 1981; after an 
average of minus 4.0 percent between 
1973-80;
(viii) Investment which averaged in­
creases of 6.0 percent between 1973-80 
jumped to 25.9 percent in 1981;
(ix) Arrears in payment for goods and 
services as of March 31, 1982 was zero; 
compared to US $105 million in 1981
Jamaicans are beginning 
to realize that conditions 
in the country are getting 
worse.
and US $50 million in 1980;
(x) Inflation fell from an annual aver­
age of 22.0 percent between 1973-80 to 
5.1 percent in 1981 but increased slight­
ly to 6.9 percent in 1982;
(xi) Unemployynent dropped from 27.3 
percent in 1980 to 25.8 percent in 1982;
(xii) Standard of Living Index improved 
by 9.3 percent in 1981; after an annual 
average deterioration of 3.6 percent 
between 1973-80;
(xiii) Major aimes decreased by 8.3 
percent in 1981; after an annual 
average increase of 7.2 percent be­
tween 1973-80;
(xiv) Industrial Relations climate im­
proved by 4.0 percent in 1981; after an 
annual average deterioration of 6.1 per­
cent between 1973-80;
(xv) Domestic exports earnings in­
creased from US $1.7 billion in 1980 to 
US $1.8 billion in 1981;
(xvi) Gross revenue from tourism, which 
declined dramatically between 1979 
and 1980, brought in $280 million in 
1981;
(xvii) Total exports of nontraditional
goods was $283 million in 1981 or $31.3 
million (i.e., 12.4 percent) more than the 
1980 figure; in 1982 the figure in­
creased to $325 million or by 15 per­
cent.
There is no doubt that the achieve­
ments outlined seem very impressive. 
In addition they have been publicly 
lauded by the highest officials in the 
Reagan administration. The adminis­
tration has specifically praised the 
Seaga government for “its remarkable 
control of prices and the impressive 
reduction in the cost of living index, as 
well as the reduction of the budget 
deficit ahead of schedule, the conserva­
tive monetary policy, fiscal restraint 
and the opening up of the economy to 
foreign (U.S.) investment”.
H owever, one must bear in mind that there are at least two sides to every story. In­deed the dialectics of economic 
progress in Jamaica suggest that the 
picture isn’t as rosy as painted by the 
government. The general contention is 
that the government’s economic prog­
nostications were overly optimistic.
In fact, during the past year, the gov­
ernment had to revise its economic 
forecasts downward and some pub­
lished analyses have concluded that 
“Jamaica Still Isn’t Making It”; that 
“Seaga Is In Trouble”; and that there 
“is a growing threat that the marginal 
progress made during the past two 
years has fueled expectations beyond 
reason” to the extent that the govern­
ment has used the marginal economic 
fortunes “to mask the multitude of for­
midable problems” facing the country 
as a result of inappropriate economic 
policies.30 In other words, deliberate at­
tempts were made to make the Jamai­
can people believe that their economic 
situtaion appeared much better than it 
really was.
A closer examination of the picture 
on the other side of the economic coin 
under the Seaga administration reveals 
the following:
First, there was a price index increase 
on “an annualized basis” of 4.7 percent 
in 1981 over 1980 and an 8.4 percent in­
crease in 1982 over 1981. As a result of 
the November 1983 devaluation of 77 
percent, gasoline prices increased from 
J$6.00 to J$9.00 per gallon (i.e., US 
$1.85 to US $2.74) by the end of 1983;
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of trade increase of US $300 million in 
1980 to US $600 million in 1981. In 
1982, the trade deficit was US $619 
million. In 1983, total export earnings 
fell by 10.8 percent. The country’s 
balance of payments deficit now stands 
at US $280 million, while the deficit on 
current account is about US $550 mil­
lion, reflecting an increase over the past 
three years of almost 50 percent.
Fifth, the production of bauxite, which 
is the main source of foreign exchange
tion in the last harvest. And to make 
matters worse, the sugar industry was 
severely hit by a foreign exchange 
shortage which was precipitated by the 
ill-advised implantation of a parallel 
market for the exchange of convertible 
currency by the government in Janu­
ary 1983.
Seventh, conditions in Jamaica in 1982 
were severe for the “ordinary people’’ 
in terms of their basic needs. For exam­
ple, there were chronic shortages of
public transportation and utility rates 
(electricity) increased by 17-54 percent; 
the price of milk went up by 40 cents. 
Inflation hit a double-digit 16.7 percent 
in 1983, after rising to only 6.5 percent 
in 1982. As of October 1982, the Seaga 
government’s own statistics showed 
that 48 percent of Jamaica’s workers 
earned less than JA $40.00 or US 
$13.00 per week.
S econd, domestic food production declined by 19.2 percent dur­ing the first half of 1982 and there was a 45 percent in­
crease in food imports in 1981 over 
1980 and a 17 percent hike during the 
first half of 1982, compared to the same 
period in 1981. In addition, the Jamai­
can Agricultural Society (JAS) has criti­
cized the government’s import policy 
and has expressed fear that if the situa­
tion continues “there is going to be 
absolutely no production in agriculture 
in Jamaica”. According to the JAS, “all 
we hear is produce for exports, and 
nobody is talking about producing for 
local consumption”. What the JAS sug­
gested is that the government conduct 
“a massive educational drive to review 
the trend of people preferring foreign 
goods to local goods”. There should 
also be proper presentation and packag­
ing to appeal to local consumers. The 
Seaga government has ignored this 
policy advice because its stated policy 
is to gear the Jamaican economy in the 
colonial “export-basis” direction and 
not meet the basic needs of the Jamai­
can people. Emphasis is on satisfying 
the American metropolitan market.
Third, total external debt increased 
from US $1.4 billion between 1980-82 
to US $2.3 billion by the end of 1983. 
This means that each Jamaican owes 
$1000 as his/her share of this debt. 
Foreign debt now consumes 28 percent 
of all export earnings. Net foreign 
reserves stood at minus US $700 
million in 1982, compared to minus US 
$574 million in 1981 and minus US 
$481.1 million in 1980. As a result, the 
national coffers are dry despite the 
massive infusion of overseas loans and 
the fact that the government borrows 
about US $1.5 million per day.
Fourth, total imports in 1980 were US 
$1.7 billion, while exports were US $1.4 
billion; in 1981 total imports were US 
$2.1 billion while exports were US $1.5 
billion, that is, an unfavorable balance
earnings and a major source of govern­
ment revenue, fell by 29.9 percent in 
1982; the production of alumina also fell 
by about 23 percent; in addition, 1,500 
workers were laid off in the bauxite in­
dustry in 1982. In 1981, Jamaica earned 
over $300 million from the export of 
bauxite and alumina, but in 1982 earn­
ings dropped to about $240 million. 
This figure includes the U.S. stockpile 
purchase of $67 million worth of 
Jamaican bauxite in September 1982.
Sixth, Jainaica’s sugar industry is now 
headed for bankruptcy as seven state- 
owned mills have been forced to close. 
The closing of these mills has meant the 
loss of jobs for 11,800 workers. Accor­
ding to the National Sugar Company 
(NSC), the sugar industry lost $300 mil­
lion along with a $50 million additional 
loss resulting from the drop in produc­
drugs and medical supplies in govern­
ment hospitals and health centers; 
water and flour shortages; electrical 
black-outs; and inefficient bus transpor­
tation and mail services.* These condi­
tions were compounded by the laying 
off of workers at the Kingston Trans­
shipment Port at Port Bustamante and 
at the Kingston Wharves Limited and 
Western Terminals; the laying off of 
workers by Reynolds Jamaica Mines; 
and the surplus of employees of the Na­
tional Sugar Group of Companies.
A s a riposte against the govern­ment’s economic policies and the progressively deteriorating economic and human condi­
tions, the Jamaican working class took 
the following actions: (i) strikes by 
Kingston dock workers, the sugar in-
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dustry workers, the field workers in the 
Frome factory, and the drivers and con­
ductors who delivered mail to the rural 
areas, (ii) protest demonstrations by the 
government’s legal officers attached to 
the courts, (iii) island wide sick-outs by 
registered nurses, ancillary workers 
and psychiatric aides and, (iv) a slow­
down by production workers at the 
Seprod Group of Companies which pro­
duces soaps, cooking oil, detergents, 
commeal and animal feed.
tion open. The small manufacturers 
have also described the government’s 
credit policies as “not realistic”.
Eighth, in September 1982, the govern­
ment had to revise its predicted 4 percent 
growth rate downwards to a mere 1 per­
cent because of declining productivity 
in key sectors. In addition, confidential 
projections by the government’s eco­
nomic planners have indicated that 
short term economic problems will 
grow, viz, current account deficit is ex­
In addition, local small manufacturers 
were unhappy over the “government’s 
insensitivity to (their) peculiar prob­
lems.” They complained that they were 
being “squeezed” out of business 
because of a number of problems, not 
the least among them being the govern­
ment’s tendency to treat small-scale 
enterprises as being on par with the 
large-scale industrial and manufactur­
ing giants who were able to fend for 
themselves and needed no assistance. 
As a result, several small factories, due 
to financial difficulties, lack of raw 
materials and import licenses, had to 
open only seasonally for three weeks 
during Easter and for special holidays 
during which time they manufactured 
as much of their particular product as 
possible, then closed down the factory, 
leaving only the retail or wholesale sec­
pected to reach $274 million by 1986, 
and the trade deficit could reach $562 
million, forcing the government to 
secure loans to cover a financial gap 
that could increase from the current 
$29.83 million to $97.7 million by 1986.
Ninth, conditions in the education 
system have reached such a cancerous 
state that Alfred Sangster, principal of 
the College of Arts, Science and Tech­
nology (CAST) warned the government 
that the College was faced with “the 
constant hemorrhage of qualified staff” 
who left for the private sector “or 
worse still to specially created quasi­
government agencies with inflated 
emoluments” and that the government 
had to “come to terms with the condi­
tions of service for its teachers or there 
will shortly not be an educational 
system on which to build any future.”
The government paid no attention to 
this gloomy warning. Approximately 
six months later (October 1982), the 
Ministry of Education announced a 50 
percent cut in the 1982-83 operational 
budget for new secondary schools. One 
of the main functions of these schools 
was to prepare students with market­
able, technical skills. The budget cuts 
left these vocational areas almost inop­
erative and teachers expressed deep 
concern for the future of the program. 
The cuts served to further frustrate the 
efforts of committed teachers, to drive 
them from the classrooms and to 
threaten the possible closing of some 
schools. In a final attempt to salvage 
this component of the country’s voca­
tional program, the Association of Prin­
cipals and Vice-Principals of these 
schools sent a resolution to the Ministry 
of Education. It stated, in part:
. . .Be it resolved that this association 
views the attitude of the Ministry of Edu­
cation as not in keeping with the best 
interest of education as it affects these 
schools, and be it further resolved that this 
association urges the Ministry of Educa­
tion to restore the operational budget of 
new secondary schools even to the 1981-82 
level forthwith so that some degree of nor­
mality can be restored to the schools to pre­
vent them from being closed...
It must be pointed out that these 
budget cuts by the Jamaican Ministry of 
Education are analogous to the budget 
cuts in educational and job-training pro­
grams by the Reagan administration. 
The net effects of these policies of the 
two governments are that the budget 
cuts “strike disproportionately and 
severely at society’s poorest and most 
dependent citizens” and “unfortunately 
and un-intentionally” create “welfare 
dependency” rather than produce the 
kind of technically-skilled citizens who 
can “pull themselves out of welfare 
dependency” and atrophy.
T enth, the managing director of Estate Development Company of the Ministry of Housing has sta ted  unequivocally 
that “the country may never solve its 
housing problems in this decade” and 
that the most the government can hope 
to achieve is to keep the problems 
“under control and to an acceptable 
degree”. The problems have been com­
pounded by the fact that government
33
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policy has relied on the private sector to 
be “the greatest provider of housing for 
the people of the country”. The reality, 
however, was the private sector only 
showed interest in housing develop­
ment as it concerned the upper-middle 
and upper-income brackets. By so do­
ing, they were able to maximize then- 
rates of return, with minimal invest­
ment problems or risks. Government 
policy has been oblivious to the many 
Jamaican families who have been left 
“homeless and without hope of owning 
34 their own home”.
In 1982, the housing shortage in 
Jamaica was 65,000 units. In addition, 
rent and security of shelter for the peo­
ple were number one priorities on the 
public opinion polls.
The housing problem reached such a 
critical stage that the opposition leader, 
Michael Manley, was compelled to con­
clude during his 1982 budget speech to 
Parliament that “the government has 
no housing policy.” Manley said that 
the increases in the importation and the 
production of construction materials 
were not going towards building hous­
ing for the poor, but were for commer­
cial building and housing for the rich. In 
addition, he said that existing housing 
settlements were in an advanced state 
of decay, social and economic infra­
structure was missing from the devel­
opments, rents were excessive, the 
landlord-bailiff was the terror of poor 
people and certain greedy private sec­
tor developers were ripping off unfor­
tunate house purchasers for non­
existent schemes. He also indicated 
that during his tenure “there were Rent 
Laws establishing Rent Boards and 
Community Tribunals to ensure fan- 
rent for tenants and fair treatments by 
landlords. Rents were rolled back in 
many cases.”
Manley further stated that be­tween 1976 and 1980, the Na­tional Housing Trust (NHT) built over 17,381 housing 
units, but in the first two years since the 
Seaga government took office, only 
1,100 housing units were started. The 
NHT was created during the Manley 
administration “to mobilize workers’ 
savings to provide them with housing 
on an income-related basis.” Emphasis 
was on providing low and middle in­
come housing.
Eleventh, the government has been 
publicly accused of “contradicting 
employment figures for the island”. 
According to Manley, Prime Minister 
Seaga has indicated that in 1981 his 
administration reduced unemployment 
by 0.6 percent since taking office. In 
other words, the government boasts 
that unemployment stood at 26 percent 
in 1981 implying that that figure was 32 
percent when Seaga came into office. 
However, Manley has indicated that if 
that’s the case, then the prime minister 
was guilty of “gross dishonesty” 
because “unemployment figures are 
taken in April and October of each year. 
The unemployment figure for Novem­
ber 1980 was 26.8 percent”.
In reality, official records have re­
vealed that the level of unemployment 
actually increased from 261,500 to 
280,700 over the period October 1981 
to April 1982. It stood at the end at 27 
percent. This represented a 1.4 percent 
increase in the jobless rate over the 
period. The government’s own Depart­
ment of Statistics also has shown that 
the unemployment rate increased from 
26.2 percent to 27 percent between 
April 1981 and April 1982. The 
unemployment rate among women in 
April 1982 was 43.1 percent, up from 
42.9 percent since October 1981. The 
rate among men stood at 15.3 percent, 
an increase of 1.1 percent since October 
1981. At the end of 1983, unemploy­
ment officially stood at 27 percent or 
over 300,000 Jamaicans out of work in 
spite of the government’s boasts of 
economic recovery and new jobs.
The mood of the country, therefore, 
is that the unemployment rate has 
reached “catastrophic proportions.” 
The general contention is that by put­
ting the entire responsibility in the 
hands of the private sector, the “gov­
ernment accepts no responsibility itself 
for indicating and implementing pro­
grams which will have the effect of 
creating direct employment.” There 
also has been a clarion call for a “Na­
tional Objective” to reduce the unem­
ployment rate to two or three percent 
because unemployment is seen “as the 
root cause of several other problems.” 
In addition, the opposition party has 
called upon the government “to pub­
licly state what it is doing to reverse this 
alarming rise in unemployment while 
we are supposed to be in a period of
recovery.” As the pro-government Daily 
Gleaner concurs: “not until this problem 
(unemployment) is solved, can Seaga 
regard his government as successful.”
Twelfth, another glaring testimony of 
the negative detrimental impact of the 
Seaga government’s policies is in the 
area of migration (brain drain) of thou­
sands of Jamaicans to the United 
States. Jamaicans have become so 
frustrated with their government’s 
policies that they have resorted to ille­
gal entry into the United States by 
means of forged U.S. birth certificates.
It is very instructive to recall that 
conventional wisdom once suggested 
that thousands of qualified, professional 
and middle-income Jamaicans left the 
country when the Manley administra­
tion adopted its policy of Democratic 
Socialism in 1974 as a means to meet 
the basic needs of the broad masses of 
the Jamaican people. Ironically, in 
1982, several thousands of poor disen­
chanted low-income Jamaicans left the 
country because of the pro-U.S. busi­
ness, private enterprise (sector) and 
non-Jamaican orientation of its govern­
ment’s policies.
In examining the startlingly high rate 
of migration, it was uncovered that 100 
permanent visas and 400 non-perma­
nent visas were granted daily. On an ag­
gregate basis, this means that each year 
36,000 Jamaicans have been leaving the 
country permanently for the United 
States.
F inally, it is again instructive to recall that during the 1980 general elections, the JLP cam­paigned and won on the slogan 
that the “poor can’t take no more.” 
Since taking office, however, the ruling 
JLP government has concluded that, in­
deed, the poor can take some more.
Thirteenth, juxtaposed to the twin 
problems of chronic high unemploy­
ment and migration is the “moral mess” 
that has permeated all aspects of life in 
Jamaica under the Seaga government. 
Church ministers have publicly warned 
the government that “no nation that 
kicks morality overboard can survive” 
while in an editorial in The Jamaica Daily 
News (December 29, 1982), Jean
Jackson surmises:
. . . Looking back at the year 1982, it 
seems that the focus ivas on the material; 
the emphasis on the tangible to the exclu-
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sion of the intangible; on the ability to beat 
any and every system to satisfy the wants 
of the individual; on judging the worth of 
a person by the outward signs of prosperity 
with very little attention to the intrinsic 
values o f life (and morality). . .
F or many Jamaicans, 1983 was to have been “the year of deliver­ance”. Instead it has become a year of doubt, uncertainty, and 
chaos, combining an unprecedented 
one-party state apparatus with a 
recession-riddled economy. The situa­
tion is very volatile. Seaga campaigned 
on the slogan of deliverance from what 
he then charged were eight years of 
mismanagement and leftist policies of 
the Manley government that had left 
the economy in shambles. He pleaded 
with the citizenry to give him only three 
years to turn the economy around. But 
after three years, many Jamaicans are 
convinced that their deliverance is not 
near, but far, far away. □
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